

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 181370

55

ORIGIN SS-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /011 R

66611

DRAFTED BY: PM/PA: PWIELAND

APPROVED BY: PM/PA: AWFORD

S/S-O: SFRY

----- 076802

O 122100Z SEP 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 181370

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT BANGKOK 14026 SENT ACTION CINCPAC PRIORITY INFO  
SECSTATE SECDEF, SEPTEMBER 7TH:

QUOTE S E C R E T BANGKOK 14026

CINCPAC PASS TO DEPUTY SECRETARY CLEMENTS

PERSONAL FROM AMBASSADOR UNGER

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, TH

SUBJECT: THAI INTEREST IN MORE MILITARY AID

1. ON THE BASIS OF RECENT TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER THANOM AND  
OTHER LEADERS OF THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT, I EXPECT THEY WILL  
SEEK FROM YOU DURING YOUR VISIT SOME COMMITMENT FOR ADDITIONAL  
US MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

2. THE THAI ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH THE DECLINE IN MAP APPRO-  
PRIATIONS FOR THAILAND, PARTICULARLY AT A TIME WHEN THEY SEE US  
FORCES DISENGAGING FROM THE AREA AND VIEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INDO-  
CHINA AS A CONTINUING THREAT TO THEIR SECURITY. THEY SEEM TO CON-  
SIDER THAT THE DROP IN TOTAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND THE PROPOSALS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 181370

PENDING IN CONGRESS FOR A CEILING ON THE THAI MAP CONFIRM THAT, AT

THE SAME TIME THE U.S. IS REDUCING ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN SEA, IT IS ALSO CUTTING BACK ON THE AID THAILAND NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN ITS DEFENSES AND BECOME MORE SELF-SUFFICIENT. THEIR CONCERN IS HEIGHTENED BY THE FACT THAT THE INDOCHINA WAR, FAR FROM BEING OVER, IS AS THE THAI SEE IT STILL SERIOUS. PROSPECTS IN CAMBODIA ARE PARTICULARLY DISTURBING, AND EVEN IF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IS ACHIEVED IN LAOS, PROSPECTS FOR REAL STABILITY THERE ARE HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE. MEANWHILE, THAILAND'S COMMUNIST INSURGENCY SEEMS TO BE HEATING UP WITH INCIDENTS IN AUGUST RUNNING 50 PER CENT ABOVE THE RATE OF AUGUST 1972.

3. WHILE THE THAI WANT TO STAND ON THEIR OWN FEET, THEY BELIEVE THEIR MILITARY FORCES ARE STILL DEFICIENT FOR WHAT THEY REGARD AS A GROWING THREAT IN INDOCHINA WHICH APPROACHES THEIR FRONTIERS IN CAMBODIA NOW AS WELL AS LAOS. THEY ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NIXXON DOCTRINE BUT HAVE SERIOUS DOUBTS NOW THAT THE U.S. WILL CARRY OUT ITS PART OF THIS CONCEPT AND PROVIDE ADEQUATE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ENABLE THEM TO DEFEND THEMSELVES.

4. THANOM HAS PUBLICLY STATED THAT EACH OF THE MILITARY SERVICES IS DRAWING UP A LIST OF WHAT IT NEEDS, SO WE EXPECT TO BE PRESENTED IN DUE COURSE (PERHAPS DURING YOUR VISIT) WITH A SUBSTANTIAL SHOPPING LIST. DURING THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT LAST FEBRUARY, THE THAI GAVE BRIGADIER GENERAL DUNN AN "INFORMAL REQUEST" FOR MILITARY AID OF \$225 MILLION PER ANNUM BEGINNING THIS FISCAL YEAR; THIS PROBABLY INDICATES THE DIMENSIONS THEY HAVE IN MIND, ALTHOUGH THE THAI ARE REALISTIC ENOUGH NOT TO EXPECT TO GET ANYWHERE NEAR THIS AMOUNT.

5. THE THAI LEADERSHIP ALSO BASES ITS CASE FOR SPECIAL U.S. ASSISTANCE ON THE ANALOGY THEY SEE BETWEEN THE U.S. REDEPLOYMENTS NOW BEGINNING IN THAILAND AND (A) THE WITHDRAWAL OF ONE U.S. DIVISION FROM KOREA, WHICH WAS ACCOMPANIED BY OUR PROMISE OF AN EXTENSIVE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM FOR THE ROK FORCES, AND (B) U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM WHEN VAST QUANTITIES OF EQUIPMENT WERE LEFT BEHIND BY U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES FOR THE USE OF THE RVNAF. THEY UNDOUBTEDLY CONSIDER THAT THIS MAY BE THEIR LAST CHANCE TO OBTAIN FROM US THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT THEY DESIRE WHILE WE ARE DEPENDENT ON THE CONTINUED TENANCY OF THAI BASES TO FULFILL OUR COMMITMENTS IN THE AREA.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 181370

6. I HAVE USED EVERY POSSIBLE OCCASION TO EXPLAIN THE CONSTANCY OF OUR COMMITMENT TO OUR THAI ALLIES AND OUR MORE GENERAL CONCERN WITH ENSURING STABILITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, WHILE ALSO ATTEMPTING TO DEFLATE THEIR EXPECTATIONS FOR NEW PROGRAMS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE. I HAVE ALSO TAKEN PAINS TO KEEP THEM CURRENTLY INFORMED ON CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE BILLS. THEY WILL EXPECT YOU, AS A TOP LEVEL VISITOR FROM WASHINGTON, TO GIVE THEM

FURTHER INSIGHTS INTO THE PROSPECTS FOR THAI MAP THIS YEAR AND THEY WILL HOPE FOR AND PROBABLY PRESS FOR MORE ENCOURAGING INDICATIONS THAN HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE THUS FAR.

7. WE WILL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO GET THE THAI TO MAKE BETTER USE OF THEIR PRESENT ASSETS AND SHIFT MORE TO FMS, BUT AT LEAST AS LONG AS WE CONTINUE TO DEPEND ON THAI GEOGRAPHY AS THE BASE FOR OUR POSITION OF STRENGTH TO ENFORCE THE INDOCHINA PEACE SETTLEMENT, WE MUST TAKE LEGITIMATE THAI NEEDS INTO ACCOUNT AND DO WHAT WE CAN TO HELP THEM AND THUS PRESERVE A COOPERATIVE ATMOSPHERE. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY HAVE ASKED WHETHER WE COULD LEAVE BEHIND SOME OV-10 AIRCRAFT AS OUR AIR FORCE WITHDRAWS. THE THAI HAVE ALREADY PURCHASED TWO SQUADRONS OF OV-10'S UNDER FMS USING THEIR OWN FUNDS TO REPLACE THEIR AGEING T-28 FIGHTERS. THE OV-10 HAS PROVED ITSELF USEFUL TO THE THAI FOR FORWARD AIR CONTROL AND CLOSE GROUND SUPPORT IN COMBATING THE INSURGENCY. ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTAND THE USAF WANTS TO USE THESE LIGHT AIRCRAFT TO UPGRADE THEIR OWN SQUADRONS ELSEWHERE, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD GIVE SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSFERRING SEVERAL SQUADRONS OF OV-10'S TO THE THAI AT AN APPROPRIATE STAGE OF FORCE REDUCTIONS. WE SHOULD ALSO BE THINKING IN TERMS OF MAKING SOME EXTRA EFFORTS TO FULFILL REQUESTS FOR THE OTHER SERVICES (SUCH AS LONG RANGE ARTILLERY AND PERSONNEL CARRIERS FOR THE ARMY) WHICH REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THAI SELF-DEFENSE AND COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORTS.

8. GIVEN THE REALITIES OF OUR BUDGETARY PROCESSES AND THE CURRENT REQUIREMENT THAT ALL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THAILAND BE CHARGED TO MAP, I HAVE STRESSED TO THE THAI LEADERS THAT THE SPECIFICS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE EXPLORED BETWEEN THE THAI ARMED FORCES AND MACHTAI SO THAT OUR MAP REQUESTS REFLECT THE RTG'S REAL CURRENT PRIORITIES. I HOPE YOU WILL FIND IT POSSIBLE TO BE FORTHCOMING IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TOP THAI OFFICIALS ALTHOUGH I RECOGNIZE THAT YOU MAY WELL BE IN NO POSITION TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENT ON SPECIFICS. I DO HOPE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 181370

THAT YOUR VISIT HERE WILL GIVE YOU AN APPRECIATION OF THE SINCERITY OF OUR THAI FRIENDS SO THAT WE CAN COUNT ON YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT IN OUR EFFORTS TO GET THE AID THAT IS NECESSARY TO STRENGTHEN THAILAND'S DEFENSE AND KEEP THE THAI ON COURSE WITH US IN MAINTAINING A MEANINGFUL AMERICAN PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

9. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS WITH UOU FURTHER DURING YOUR FORTHCOMING VISIT TO BANGKOK.

UNGER

UNQUOTE RUSH

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MILITARY ASSISTANCE, MILITARY AIRCRAFT, JET AIRCRAFT, FOREIGN COMMITMENTS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 12 SEP 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** collinp0  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973STATE181370  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** PM/PA: PWIELAND  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** P750014-0863  
**From:** SS  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19730938/aaaabbzm.tel  
**Line Count:** 166  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** collinp0  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 05 DEC 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <05-Dec-2001 by martinml>; APPROVED <28 FEB 2002 by collinp0>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** THAI INTEREST IN MORE MILITARY AID  
**TAGS:** MASS, TH, US  
**To:** SEOUL  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005